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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellant asserts the following four issues on appeal: 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in not recognizing the legal right of 
Cache Valley Bank to setoff1 the Construction Associates bank account? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretations are questions of law which 
the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Guardian State Bank v. Lambert, 
834 P.2d 605, 606-07; (Utah App. 1992). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial 
court's Order which included the determination set forth. 
2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in extending the scope of a Writ of 
Garnishment to subsequent bank deposits made by Construction Associates? 
Standard of Review: Errors in legal conclusions and rules of procedure 
are questions of law which the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Brown v. 
Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 544 (Utah 2000). N.A.R., Inc. v. Walker, 37 P.3d 1068, 1069 
(Utah App. 2001). 
1
 The words "setoff and "offset" are synonymous. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 
2004). "[CJourts use the terms 'offset1 and 'setoff interchangeably, often switching 
between them from sentence to sentence, supporting the conclusion that there is no 
substantive difference between them.1' 4 Ann Taylor Schwing, California Affirmative 
Defenses 2d § 44:1, at 4-5 (1996). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial 
court's Order which included determination of the issue set forth. 
3. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in granting attorneys fees to Bud Bailey 
Construction? 
Standard of Review: The award of legal fees was based upon legal 
conclusions and an interpretation of the Rule 64D, Utah R. Civ. P. Legal conclusions 
and interpretations of statutes are questions of law which the Court of Appeals may 
review for correctness. Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 544 (Utah 2000). N.A.R., Inc. v. 
Walker, 37 P.3d 1068, 1069 (Utah App. 2001). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial 
court's Order which included determination of the issue set forth at Section 15. 
4. Issue: Whether service of the Writ of Garnishment upon Cache Valley 
Bank complied with Rule 4? 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
are questions of law which the Court of Appeals may review for correctness. Brown v. 
Glover, 16 P.3d 540, 544; 2000 UT 89 (Ut 2000). N.A.R., Inc. v. Walker, 37 P.3d 
1068, 1069; 2001 UT 98 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue is preserved by appeal from the trial 
court's Order which included determination of the issue set forth at its Section 3. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in not recognizing the legal right of 
Cache Valley Bank to setoff the Construction Associates bank account? 
§70A-9a-104. Control of deposit account. 
(1) A secured party has control of a deposit account if: 
(a) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is 
maintained; 
• • • 
(2) A secured party that has satisfied subsection (1) has control, even if 
the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the 
deposit account. 
§70A-9a-108. Sufficiency of description. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3), (4), and (5), a 
description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it 
is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), a description of 
collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the 
collateral by: 
(1) specific listing; 
(2) category; 
(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (5), a type of 
collateral defined in this title; 
(4) quantity; 
(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure; or 
(6) except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), any other 
method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable. 
« • • 
§70A-9a-203. Attachment and enforceability of security interest -
Proceeds - Supporting obligations - Formal requisites. 
(1) A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes 
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an 
agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i), a 
security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with 
respect to the collateral only if : 
(a) value has been given; 
(b) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer 
rights in the collateral to a secured party; and 
(c) one of the following conditions is met: 
(iv) the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, 
investment property, or letter-of-credit rights, and the secured 
party has control under Section 9-104, 9-105, 9-106, or 9-107 
pursuant to the debtor's security agreement. 
§70A~9a-312 Perfection of security interests in chattel paper, 
deposit accounts, documents, goods covered by documents, 
instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, and 
money - Perfection by permissive filing - Temporary perfection 
without filing or transfer of possession. 
( I ) - . . 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-9a-315(c) and (d) for 
proceeds: 
(a) a security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by 
control under Section 70A-9a-314; 
§70A-9a-314 Perfection by control. 
(1)A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts, letter-
of-credit rights, or electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control 
of the collateral under Section 70A-9a-104, 70A-9a-105, 70A-9a-106, 
or70A-9a-107. 
(2) A security interest in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, or 
letter-of-credit rights is perfected by control under Section 70A-9a-
104, 70A-9a-105, or 70A-9a-107 when the secured party obtains 
control and remains perfected by control only while the secured party 
retains control. 
§70A-9a-315. Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral and 
in proceeds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this article and in Section 70A-2-
403(2): 
(a) a security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition 
thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the 
security interest or agricultural lien; and 
(b) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of 
collateral. 
(2) Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable 
proceeds: 
(1) if the proceeds are goods, to the extent provided by Section 70A-
9a-336; and 
(2) if the proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the secured party 
identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including application 
of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this 
article with respect to commingled property of the type involved. 
(3) A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the 
security interest in the original collateral was perfected. 
(4) A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on 
the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless: 
(a) the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral; 
(ii) the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be 
perfected by filing in the office in which the financing statement 
has been filed; and 
(hi) the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds; 
(b) the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or 
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than under 
subsection (3) when the security interest attaches to the proceeds or 
within 20 days thereafter. 
(5) If a filed financing statement covers the original collateral, a 
security interest in proceeds which remains perfected under Subsection 
(4)(a) becomes unperfected at the later of: 
(a) when the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses 
under Section 70A-9a-515 or is terminated under Section 70A-9a-
513; or 
(b) the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds. 
§70A-9a-327 Priority of security interests in deposit account. 
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests 
in the same deposit account: 
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the 
deposit account under Section 70A-9a-104 has priority over a 
conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have 
control. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsections (3) and (4), security 
interests perfected by control under Section 70A-9a-314 rank 
according to priority in time of obtaining control. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), a security interest 
held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has 
priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured 
party. 
(4) A security interest perfected by control under Subsection 70A-9a-
104(l)(c) has priority over a security interest held by the bank with 
which the deposit account is maintained. 
§70A-9a-340 Effectiveness of right of recoupment or set-off against 
deposit aecount 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), a bank with which a 
deposit account is maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or 
set-off against a secured party that holds a security interest in the 
deposit account. 
(3) The exercise by a bank of a set-off against a deposit account is 
ineffective against a secured party that holds a security interest in the 
deposit account which is perfected by control under Section 70A-9a-
104(i)(c), if the set-off is based on a claim against the debtor. 
§70A-9a-341. Bank's rights and duties with respect to deposit 
account 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-9a-340(c), and unless the 
bank otherwise agrees in an authenticated record, a bank's rights and 
duties with respect to a deposit account maintained with the bank are not 
terminated, suspended, or modified by: 
(1) the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the 
deposit account; 
(2) the bank's knowledge of the security interest; or 
(3) the bank's receipt of instructions from the secured party. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in extending the scope of a Writ of 
Garnishment to subsequent bank deposits made by Construction Associates? 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64D. Writ of garnishment 
(a) Availability. A writ of garnishment is available to seize property of the 
defendant in the possession or under the control of a person other than the 
defendant. A writ of garnishment is available after final judgment or after the 
claim has been filed and prior to judgment... 
• • • 
(g) Garnishee's responsibilities. The writ shall direct the garnishee to complete 
the following within seven business days of service of the writ upon the garnishee: 
(g)(1) answer the interrogatories under oath or affirmation; 
(g)(2) serve the answers on the plaintiff; 
(g)(3) serve the writ, answers, notice of exemptions and two copies of the reply 
form upon the defendant and any other person shown by the records of the 
garnishee to have an interest in the property; and 
(g)(4) file the answers with the clerk of the court. 
The garnishee may amend answers to interrogatories to correct errors or to reflect 
a change in circumstances by serving and filing the amended answers in the same 
manner as the original answers. 
(h) Reply to answers; request for hearing. 
(h)(1) The plaintiff or defendant may file and serve upon the garnishee a reply 
to the answers and request a hearing. The reply shall be filed and served within 10 
days after service of the answers or amended answers, but the court may deem the 
reply timely if filed before notice of sale of the property or before the property is 
delivered to the plaintiff. The reply may: 
(h)( 1 )(A) challenge the issuance of the writ; 
(h)(1)(B) challenge the accuracy of the answers; 
(h)(1)(C) claim the property or a portion of the property is exempt; or 
(h)(1)(D) claim a set off. 
(h)(2) The reply is deemed denied, and the court shall conduct an evidentiary 
hearing. 
(h)(3) If a person served by the garnishee fails to reply, as to that person: 
(h)(3)(A) the garnishee's answers are deemed correct; and 
(h)(3)(B) the property is not exempt, except as reflected in the answers. 
(i) Delivery of property. A garnishee shall not deliver property until the 
property is due the defendant. Unless otherwise directed in the writ, the garnishee 
shall retain the property until 20 days after service by the garnishee under 
subsection (g). If the garnishee is served with a reply within that time, the 
garnishee shall retain the property and comply with the order of the court entered 
after the hearing on the reply. Otherwise, the garnishee shall deliver the property 
as provided in the writ, 
(j) Liability of garnishee. 
(j)(l) A garnishee who acts in accordance with this rule, the writ or an order of 
the court is released from liability, unless answers to interrogatories are 
successfully controverted. 
« • • 
(1) Writ of continuing garnishment. 
(1)(1) After final judgment, the plaintiff may obtain a writ of continuing 
garnishment against any non exempt periodic payment. All provisions of this rule 
apply to this subsection, but this subsection governs over a contrary provision. 
• • • 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in granting attorneys fees to Bud Bailey 
Construction? 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 64D(j)(2) 
(j) Liability of garnishee. 
(j)(2) If die garnishee fails to comply with this rule, the writ or an order of the 
court, the court may order the garnishee to appear and show cause why the 
garnishee should not be ordered to pay such amounts as are just, including the 
value of the property or the balance of the judgment, whichever is less, and 
reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's 
failure. If the garnishee shows that the steps taken to secure the property were 
reasonable, the court may excuse the garnishee's liability in whole or in part. 
Issue 4: Whether service of the Writ of Garnishment on Cache Valley Bank 
complied with Rule 4? 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4. Process. 
(d) Method of Service. Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and 
complaint shall be by one of the following methods: 
• » • 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a 
partnership or upon an unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a 
common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an 
officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or 
by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to 
receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of the summons 
and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or agent can be found within 
the state, and the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an 
office or place of business within the state or elsewhere, or does business within 
this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office or place of 
business; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is a legal dispute over garnishment rights and bank setoff rights. This 
matter deals with the efforts of Bud Bailey Construction, the judgment creditor, to 
garnish the bank deposit account of Construction Associates, the judgment debtor. 
The bank deposit account was at Cache Valley Bank, the Appellant herein. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Bud Bailey Construction applied for and obtained the issuance of a Writ of 
Garnishment which was delivered to Cache Valley Bank on November 1,2006. (R. 
98-100) Cache Valley Bank made its answer to the Writ of Garnishment on 
November 6,2006, stating that $17,901.94 was in the checking account of judgment 
debtor, Construction Associates. (R. 101-105) Construction Associates did not file 
any reply or request a hearing. The Bank remitted no funds to Bud Bailey 
Construction. 
2
 The term "delivered" is used to raise the issue as to whether service was proper on 
Cache Valley Bank. In that Response, the Bank argued that service of the Writ and 
Order were both defective as they were not served on the Bank's registered agent or 
even an officer or manager of the Bank as required by Rule 4(d)(1)(E). (R. 136, #2 & 
#3) See, Constables Reports showing service respectively on Lori Parker and Heather 
Dahle. (R. 105-111,122-132) Bud Bailey Construction argues that service on line 
employees is adequate for service of process. (T. 185, 187-188) Bank officers and 
legal counsel were hampered by this failure to make proper service as required by 
Rule 4(d)(1)(E). This is discussed in the Argument at Part IV. 
On January 23 , 2007, Bud Bailey Construction made a Motion for Order to 
Show Cause in re Contempt directed to Cache Valley Bank. The Order was issued by 
the Court and delivered3 to Cache Valley Bank. (R. 112-121) A hearing was held on 
February 12th, 2006, and after some confusion about notice4, the Bank appeared 
telephonically. By telephone counsel for the Bank explained that the Bank had a 
perfected security interest in all bank accounts. (R. 133-134) The hearing was reset 
for February 26th, 2007, and at that time Cache Valley Bank filed its written Response 
to the Garnishment and Order to Show Cause in re Contempt. (R. 135-158) In 
addition to contesting that proper service had occurred, the Bank claimed that it had 
an unlimited right to setoff the bank deposit account and that it had done so upon 
receiving the Writ of Garnishment. The Bank provided evidence in the form of 
Exhibits to its Response that it had a number of loans to Construction Associates, all 
of which were delinquent and in default. The Bank's Response noted that the notes 
and security agreements with Construction Associates provided that the Bank was 
given an unlimited right to setoff any bank deposit funds. Further, that it was secured 
on the bank deposit funds by reason of security agreements and its position as the 
Bank holding the deposit accounts. Documents supporting all these claims were 
attached to the Bank's Response. (R. 135-158) 
At the hearing of February 26 , the District Court questioned whether the Bank 
had waived its interest by fully responding and paying an earlier Garnishment in this 
3
 id. 
4
 id. 
same matter. (R. 159-160) The Bank filed a Supplemental Memorandum as to that 
issue on March 13th, 2007, and also an Affidavit with an attached Exhibit A showing 
the activity in the bank deposit account of Construction Associates from November 1, 
2006 through February 28,2007. (R. 202-232) 
Bud Bailey filed a Reply Memorandum on March 26th, 2007, admitting most of 
Cache Valley Bank's Statement of Facts but contesting many of the legal 
interpretations5 of the language in the Exhibits attached thereto. (R. 181-201). Cache 
Valley Bank filed Supplemental Exhibits on March 29th, 2007. (T. 202-232) The 
District Court held its hearing on this matter April 2,2007, receiving legal argument 
from both parties. Hearing Transcript pages 1-9, Second Addendum to Brief. 
The trial court's Order was entered on May 9, 2007. (R. 234-243, First 
Addendum to Brief). The Order provides as follows: 
(1) the Bank failed to state it was offsetting in its response of November 
6 and was not in compliance with the garnishment statute as of January 25th, 
when the trial court issued its Order to Show Cause. 
(2) the Bank did offset all the bank deposit funds of $17,901.94, on 
November 17, 2006.6 
(3) after November 1,2006, an additional $41,789.52 was deposited to 
the bank deposit account through February 28,2007. 
5
 See Bud Bailey Construction Reply, pages 2-9. (R. 182-189). 
6
 The funds were setoff from the deposit account on November 1, 2007, moved to the 
suspense account and then paid on the Construction Associates loan on November 17. 
(R. 202-232) 
(4) the Bank "instead of complying with the garnishment and order of 
the Court" allowed Construction Associates "to continue to write checks from 
said account(s) [after November 6] and did allow those checks to clear Cache 
Valley Bank to pay third-parties while the valid garnishment of Bud Bailey 
was in place." 
(5) the Bank's acts were "circumventing a valid judgment and valid 
garnishment" 
(6) the Bank's actions "violated the Order of this Court and as a result 
Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is in Contempt of the Order to Show Cause 
dated January 25,2007." 
(7) Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is "ordered to pay the sum remaining 
Oil U1C UcUiilSIllllClll ill UIV a m o u n t u i i p j o , / U 7 . / i p iuo i ; u u uuLi^y D aiiuiii&yS 
fees... in the amount of $2,279.40." 
Cache Valley Bank timely filed its appeal from this Order on June 8, 2007. (R. 244-
257) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court made no formal Findings of Fact in this matter. However, 
undisputed facts can be gleaned from the Order entered and the various pleadings and 
exhibits provided to the trial court. 
1. Bud Bailey Construction obtained a default judgment against 
Construction Associates on April 5th, 2006. (R. 72-74) 
2. Construction Associates had a deposit checking account with Cache 
Valley Bank, Account #65-025454. (R. 176-180) 
3. Bud Bailey Construction caused to be issued a Writ of Garnishment 
against that deposit account and any other accounts of Construction Associates at 
Cache Valley Bank on October 19th, 2006. (R. 235) 
4. The Writ of Garnishment was delivered to Lori Parker, an administrative 
assistant/secretary at the Bank on November 1st. (R. 235) 
5. Ms. Parker is not a registered agent, manager or officer of Cache Valley 
Bank. (R. 136,163-65, 187-88) 
6. The Cache Valley Bank's registered agent is this counsel, N. George 
Daines at 108 North Main, Logan, Utah 84321. (R. 136, 163-65) 
7. Ms. Gunnell, a bookkeeping assistant, responded with the Bank's 
Garnishee Answers on November 6th, 2006, stating that the Bank on November 1st, 
2006, had $17,901.94 in the said account. Ms. Gunnell did not answer Question #3. 
(R. 101-104) 
8. On November 1st, 2006, Cache Valley Bank setoff the total amount in the 
account of $17,901.94 to its Suspense Account and then applied that sum against a 
loan owed by Construction Associates, Loan #51-027480, on November 17th, 2006. 
(R. 214,216) 
9. As of November 1st, 2006, Cache Valley Bank had three loans owed to 
it by Defendant Construction Associates dba KRT Drywall, all of which were 
delinquent and in default as of that date; to wit: 
a. Note dated September 13,2000, amount of 150,000.00. (R. 140-41) 
b. Note dated July 10, 1998, amount of $125,000.00. (R. 142-143) 
c. Note dated November 7, 2002, amount of $46,300.00. (R. 211-212) 
10. All three Notes were secured by security interests by Commercial 
Security Agreements covering bank accounts, instruments, chattel paper, all contract 
rights, all retention amounts, claims and causes of action. Said security interests were 
duly filed. (R. 146-158,209,) 
11. That Defendant Construction Associates, Inc. dba KRT Drywall was in 
default on all three Notes as of November Ist, 2006. (R. 216-218, 220-222,224-227) 
12. That each of the loan agreements specifically granted the Bank a right of 
setoff; to wit: "I agree that you may set off any amount due and payable under this 
note against any right I have to receive money from you." See back side of each Loan 
Agreement, section highlighted as "SET-OFF". This right is also repeated in the 
section relative to "REMEDIES." (R. 143, 145, 212) 
13. The security agreement dated November 7th, 2002, among other 
designations of collateral has a box next to "Deposit Accounts" marked with an "X" 
to signify that all of the bank deposit accounts of Construction Associates are security 
for the loan obligations owed to Cache Valley Bank. (R. 206) 
14. The other security agreements also list, on the front page of each, the 
accounts of Defendant Construction Associates dba KRT Drywall are security for the 
aforesaid loans. On the back of each sheet under "REMEDIES" and elsewhere in this 
document Cache Valley Bank is formally given the right to setoff funds in its bank 
deposit accounts. (R. 146-155) 
15. Notice of all of the security agreements were duly filed with Financing 
Statements with the State of Utah and are duly on record. (R. 157-58, 209) 
16. All of the deposits into the bank deposit account of Construction 
Associates were proceeds from its accounts receivable and, as such, were also 
proceeds from the secured accounts receivable of Construction Associates, duly 
secured as such to Cache Valley Bank. Id. 
17. That on the date November 1, 2006, there was in account #65-0254-54 the 
balance of $17,901.94. (R. 176) 
18. The next deposit to said account was made by Construction Associates on 
November 7th, 2006. (R. 176, also see spreadsheet at Section II, pages 32-33 hereof) 
19. That after the garnishment was issued and served and returned, 
Construction Associates deposited to that account an additional total of $41,789.52.7 
(R. 236) 
20. After the date of November 6th, the Bank allowed Construction Associates 
to make further payments by checks drawn on the said deposit account. (R. 236 also 
see spreadsheet at Section II, pages 32-33 hereof) 
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 The sum subsequently deposited to the account was actually $45,371.88, but the 
difference between these amounts is not material as the balance owing to Bud Bailey 
Construction was less than either amount. See Spreadsheet, pages 32-33 of this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Issue: The trial court erred in not recognizing the legal right of the Cache 
Valley Bank to setoff the Construction Associates bank account. 
Summary: The trial court failed to recognize that under the provisions of 
Revised Article 9 the Bank had "control" of the bank accounts. Based upon that 
perfected security interest in the deposit accounts, the Bank was entitled to setoff the 
account even after receiving the Writ of Garnishment. 
II. Issue: The trial court erred in extending the scope of a Writ of Garnishment to 
subsequent bank deposits made by Construction Associates. 
Summary: The trial court erred in considering the Writ of Garnishment to 
have the nature of a "continuing" lien with a "superior security interest" to subsequent 
checks presented against the debtor's bank account. The Bank's position is that the 
Writ only applies to funds in the account as of the date it is served or alternatively, 
until the answer is made. The Bank's position is that it had no duty to subsequently 
segregate or pay over funds coming into the account. 
III. Issue: The trial court erred in granting attorneys fees to Bud Bailey 
Construction. 
Summary: The trial court's decision to award attorneys fees was derivative 
from its errors on the first two issues. The Bank was not in contempt of the court and 
no attorneys fees should have been awarded against it. 
IV. Issue: The service of process of the Writ of Garnishment upon Cache Valley 
Bank did not comply with Rule 4. 
Summary: Service of Writs of Garnishment should be pursuant to Rule 4. The 
Bank was not served properly and as a result any error or shortcoming in its answers 
to the interrogatories should be disregarded. When proper notice was given, the Bank 
fully explained and defended its right to setoff the funds. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE LEGAL 
RIGHT OF CACHE VALLEY BANK TO SETOFF THE DEBTOR'S BANK 
ACCOUNT. 
Effective July 1, 2001, Utah adopted the Article 9 revision of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Laws 2000, ch. 252, §177. This Article 9 revision had a number of 
salutary effects. One of the principal changes was to make clear what was necessary 
to obxain a security interest in a business debtor's bank accounts. The trial court in this 
matter wholly failed to recognize that Cache Valley Bank had obtained and held a 
valid and perfected security interest in the Construction Associates bank deposit 
account. 
Prior to the revision, Article 9 excluded from its scope "a transfer of an interest 
in any deposit account." It did not prohibit security interests in bank accounts; it 
simply left the determinations to each state's non-UCC common law. As a result some 
states passed non-uniform laws attempting to bring deposit account security interests 
within Article 9. See Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of the UCC: Scope, Perfection, 
Priorities, and Default, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 129 (2000); Bruce Markell, From 
Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised 
Article 9,1A Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 963 (1999). 
The present, revised Article 9 provides clear rules for obtaining and perfecting 
security positions in commercial8 bank deposit accounts. Cache Valley Bank had 
complied with all of these rules with respect to the Construction Associates bank 
deposit account on which Bud Bailey Construction attempted to garnish. 
1. Cache Valley Bank complied with all rules for attachment of the Construction 
Associates deposit account: 
Rule 1; Debtor must have rights in the account: Construction Associates 
had the normal rights to its regular business checking account at the Bank. 
Rule 2; Value must be given for the attachment: Cache Valley Bank's 
consideration for its security interest in the deposit account was the granting of loans 
to Construction Associates. 
Rule 3; Debtor must authenticate a security agreement that describes the 
account: Construction Associates executed security agreements that specifically 
stated that its "deposit accounts" were security for its loans. See the Commercial 
Security Agreement dated 11/7/2002; to wit: 
SECURITY INTEREST. To secure the payment and performance of the 
Secured Debts, Debtor gives Secured Party a security interest in all 
of the Property described in this Agreement... 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION. The property is described as follows: 
The Revised Article 9 excludes from its operation consumer deposit accounts. 
See §70A-9a-102(a)(26) and §70A-9a-l09(d)(3). 
|X| Deposit Accounts: All deposit accounts, including, but not 
limited to, demand, time, savings, passbook, and similar accounts. 
Commercial Security Agreement. (R. 206). This identification is an adequate 
description of the Construction Associates account. See 70A-9a-108(2)(a, b & c). 
2. Even if a particular security agreement were not authenticated and/or did not 
adequately describe the deposit account attachment will occur because the Bank 
had "control" of the Construction Associates deposit account 
Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-104, Cache Valley Bank had "control" of the 
Construction Associates deposit account: 
§70A-9a-104. Control of deposit account 
(1) A secured party has control of a deposit account if: 
(a) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit 
account is maintained; 
• • • 
(2) A secured party that has satisfied subsection (1) has control, 
even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of 
funds from the deposit account. 
Cache Valley Bank was in "control" because it was a "secured party" and it "is the 
bank with which the Construction Associates deposit account is maintained." 
Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-203(2)(c)(iv), the lack of authentication and/or 
description is cured if the "collateral is deposit accounts" and the "secured party has 
control under Section 70A-9a-104." Thus, all of the security agreements of 
Construction Associates meet this standard as they refer to security being given to 
Cache Valley Bank to all the bank accounts of Construction Associates. (R. 146-155) 
3. Cache Valley Bank's security interest in the Construction Associates bank 
accounts was perfected. 
The revised Article 9 sets forth a streamlined method for banks to perfect their 
security interests in the deposit accounts of their business customers. Filing a 
financing statement will not perfect security interests in these deposit accounts; 
perfection is gained only by "control." Section 70A-9a-312 provides that "(a) a 
security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by control under Section 
70A-9a-314." That Section provides that "(2) A security interest in deposit accounts . 
.. is perfected by control under Section 70A-9a-104 . . . when the secured party 
obtains control and remains perfected by control only while the secured party retains 
control." 
Cache Valley Bank was perfected in the deposit account of Construction 
Associates not because of a "financing statement" but because it was always in 
"control" of the deposit account. All of Bud Bailey Construction's arguments to the 
trial court that the Bank's financing statement contained inadequate descriptions in its 
security agreement or filed financing statements as to the deposits are of no effect. All 
Cache Valley Bank needed was the Construction Associates' security agreements to 
obtain a perfected security interest in the Construction Associates bank deposit 
accounts at Cache Valley Bank. 
4. Cache Valley Bank also had a security interest in the Construction Associates 
bank account funds because they were proceeds from secured accounts 
receivable. 
Pursuant to Section 70A-9a-315(3)? (4) and (5), Cache Valley Bank would 
have a security interest in any proceeds from Construction Associates accounts 
receivable for the statutory time period. All of the deposits into the Construction 
Associates deposit account were proceeds from the secured accounts receivable held 
by the Bank. Hence, this is another independent basis for the Bank's continuing 
security interest in the deposit account. 
5. Given the Bank's perfected security interest Section 7QA-9a-34Q grants Cache 
Valley Bank the right to setoff against the Construction Associates deposit 
account despite receipt of a Writ of Garnishment 
Sections 70A-9a-340 and 70A-9a-341 provide that Cache Valley Bank has the 
right to setoff the funds in the Construction Associates bank deposit account even 
after the Writ of Garnishment is received: 
§70A-9a-340 Effectiveness of right of recoupment or set-off against 
deposit account 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3), a bank with which a 
deposit account is maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or 
set-off against a secured party that holds a security interest in the 
deposit account. 
§70A-9a-341. Bank's rights and duties with respect to deposit 
account. 
. . . [Ujnless the bank otherwise agrees in an authenticated record, a 
bank's rights and duties with respect to a deposit account maintained with 
the bank are not terminated, suspended, or modified by: 
(1) the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the 
deposit account; 
(2) the bank's knowledge of the security interest; or 
(3) the bank's receipt of instructions from the secured party. 
The effect of these statutes is to place Cache Valley Bank in the position where it can 
setoff the funds in the Construction Associates deposit account even after receiving 
the Writ of Garnishment. Indeed, the clear import of these statutes is that the Bank 
can ignore the efforts of a "secured party" and/or a party holding a "writ of 
garnishment." The Bank here was entitled to setoff the funds and then pay them on 
the Construction Associates' delinquent loan. Because the garnishment was not a 
"continuing garnishment," the subsequent deposits to the account were not attached 
by the Writ of Garnishment served earlier. 
However, the clear import of revised Article 9 is that the Bank could refuse to 
pay a writ of garnishment against funds in the deposit account, irrespective of whether 
it chose to setoff those same funds toward its loans. The Bank is not required to setoff 
the funds in the account at all. It could simply refuse to allow any withdrawals of 
funds from its secured and perfected deposit account for whatever reason it chose. 
However, that is not the case here. The setoff was made and the funds were applied to 
a loan. 
The trial court erred in finding that the Bud Bailey Construction Writ of 
Garnishment created any rights in or to the Construction Associates deposit account at 
Cache Valley Bank. The trial court is simply wrong when it suggests that by its Writ 
of Garnishment, Bud Bailey established a "superior security interest." Hearing 
Transcript at page 9, line 8, Second Addendum to Brief. 
The Bank was fully within it rights to setoff the full amount in the account on 
November 1,2006. Bud Bailey Construction could not attach the account, perfect any 
interest therein nor pursuant to Utah law establish any "control" of the account. Thus 
Cache Vaiiey Bank's inteiest in the deposit account was at all times superior to that of 
Bud Bailey Construction's Writ of Garnishment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF A 
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT TO SUBSEQUENT BANK DEPOSITS MADE BY 
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES. 
This proceeding started with Bud Bailey Construction's claim that it was 
entitled to the amount in the Construction Associates bank deposit account of 
$17,901.94 on November 1,2006. (R. 102, 112) Cache Valley Bank was ordered to 
show cause why it should not be held in contempt for not remitting those funds. The 
Bank appeared and defended its position that it was entitled to setoff those garnished 
funds against its own loans to Construction Associates. The proceeding then morphed 
into a different issue raised by the trial court, the Bank's responsibility as to 
subsequent funds deposited in the account. And, as to those funds the trial court found 
the Bank responsible to pay over these funds to the amount of the remaining 
judgment. As a result of that reasoning, a judgment in the amount of $38,769.71 was 
lodged against the Bank. The trial court's reasoning was that after the Writ of 
Garnishment was received and answered, the Bank still had a continuing duty to take 
subsequent deposits and either pay them to itself or remit them to Bud Bailey 
Construction. The trial court's reasoning was that by reason of the Writ, Bud Bailey 
Construction had established a "superior security interest" as against other parties 
who later received checks from Construction Associates.9 The trial court found the 
Bank responsible for such checks and withdrawals because it allowed checks to be 
paid after its knowledge of and response to the Writ of Garnishment. 
The trial court's reasoning in arriving at this result is preserved in the Hearing 
Transcript. Second Addendum to Brief. It is suggested that the short transcript (10 
pages) be read in its entirety. A summary of the trials court's reasoning occurs in an 
interchange with Bank counsel, Todd Jenson. 
MR. JENSON: So that I'm clear then, what the Court would -
speaking hypothetically - what the Court would have like to have seen 
is on service of the second10 garnishment when the bank set off 
9
 In response to the trial court's insistence (in error) that subsequent funds must go to 
the Writ, as a "superior security interest," bank counsel made an argument that the 
Bank was trying to salvage the business with a de facto receivership. That argument 
was only made in response to the reasoning errors of the trial court; it has no legal 
basis and is not necessary to the defense or appeal arguments made herein. The 
Bank's activities in monitoring the account to try and manage funds to finish 
construction jobs are not material to any issue herein. 
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 The references to "second garnishment" have to do with the fact that the Bank 
chose to honor an initial garnishment of Bud Bailey Construction against the 
(inaudible) $17,000 and applied it to the loan, from then on all other 
funds that were received through the bank would go to -
THE COURT: Yes, I mean, $42,000 came in. If they took 
$17,000 for their loan, that's fine but there was still enough money to 
pay the garnishment. 
MR. JENSON: If the bank had kept the remaining amount to 
itself (inaudible) paid out again. 
THE COURT: Then if their security interest was superior, yes, 
they would have been allowed to do that. I don't have a problem but 
money came in, they were on notice of garnishment, they set off their 
amount, they protected themselves, they took their $17,000 but there 
was $41,000 that came in. There was enough money to pay - protect the 
bank and protect the other but unilaterally they decided not to do it. In 
fact, they moved ail these other people so that checks could go out and 
pay them ahead of their own, ahead of the garnishment that came in that 
I believe under the law had a superior security interest. 
MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that. The only difference I see 
here is that if the bank had those funds in its control and chose to release 
them so they could be paid more -
THE COURT: No, they didn't have a choice once they received 
the garnishment. They either had to take them [the deposits] themselves 
or give them to somebody that had a higher security interest. If they 
didn't want to protect their own rights - and the people that allowed this 
to do it, that controlled this was the bank and now what are they going 
to do? Are they going to go to all these individuals and get that money 
bank from them? No. I mean I know Cache Valley - they're not going 
to go to all these people that checks were written and to VISA and 
everything else and say we want this money back. 
Hearing Transcript at page 8, line 12 through page 9, line 23, Second Addendum to 
Brief. The trial court apparently concluded that the Bank did have the right to setoff 
Construction Associates bank deposit account. There are no issues as to that "first 
garnishment;" the Bank garnished and paid over those funds to Bud Bailey 
Construction in the Spring of 2006. However, this does not constitute waiver of any 
future rights to refuse to do so. 
the original $17,910.94 and any additional funds that it would choose to setoff. The 
trial court's judgment against the Bank is based upon the Bank's failure to remit to 
Bud Bailey Construction the subsequent funds that were deposited into the account 
and not setoff by the Bank. That is how the trial court arrives at the surprising 
decision to make the Bank pay the remaining amount of the Bud Bailey Construction 
judgment. 
Before dealing directly with the legal issue it is important to understand the 
timeline of Construction Associates subsequent deposits as to the Writ of 
Garnishment:11 
Construction Associates Bank Account 65-1 
Date 
l-Nov-06 
l-Nov-06 
l-Nov-06 
2-Nov-06 
6-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 
7-Nov-06 1 
8-Nov-06 
9-Nov-06 
14-Nov-06_[ 
Description 
1 Balance in Deposit Account 
1 Writ of Garnishment Received 
1 Setoff to Bank Suspense Account 
#74982 - Presented & Refused 
Bank Responds to Garnishment 
Deposit - Amount to be Corrected 
Deposit Correction 
Deposit 
Check #74983 
Check #74985 
Check #74992 
Check #74993 
Check #74995 
Check #74996 1 
Check #74994 
Check #74984 
Deposit^  _ | 
Credit 
$3,015.09 
1 $4,927.67 
-$10.00 
$2,716.52 
$10,781.55 
)254-54 
I Debit 
$17,910.94 
$3,015.09 
$1,553.51 
$1,288.71 
$39.00 
$39.69 
$1,812.60 
$1,107.67 , 
$82.92 i 
$668.29 
Balance 
$17,910.94 
$17,910.94 
$0.00 
$0.00 I 
$0.00 
$4,927.67 
$4,917.67 
$7,634.19 
$6,080.68 
$4,791.97 
$4,752.97 
$4,713.28 
$2,900.68 
$1,793.01 
$1,710.09 
$1,041.80 
$11,823.35 
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 (R. 176-180, Deposits and checks are placed in chronological order rather than by 
check numbers in the inserted table. The exhibits list checks by check number.) 
1 14-Nov-06 
14-Nov-06 
14-Nov-06 
14-Nov-06 
14-Nov-06 
15-Nov-06 
15-Nov-06 
16-Nov-06 
21-Nov-06 
22-Nov-06 
22-Nov-06 
22-Nov-06 
27-Nov-06 
30-Nov-06 
30-Nov-06 
1 l-Dec-06 
l-Dec-06 
4-Dec-06 
6-Dec-06 
14-Dec-06 
14-Dec-06 | 
14-Dec-06 
15-Dec-06 1 
15-Dec-06 
15-Dec-06 
18-Dec-06 
18-Dec-06 
4-Jan-07 
1 ACH Debit 
Check #74988 
Check #74997 
Check #74998 
Check #75111 
Check #74999 
Check #75112 
Check #74987 
Check #75113 
Deposit 
Check #75115 
Check #74986 
Check #75116 
Service Charge 
Re-presented Check #74982 
Check #75117 
Deposit 
Check #75114 
Check #75118 
Deposit 
Auto Transfer Debit 
Deposit 
Deposit 
Check #75121 
Check #75124 
Check #75122 
Check #75125 
Check #75128 
TOTAL AFTER RESPONSE [ 
$6,415.67 
$2,025.00 
$11,704.32 
$203.70 
$6,607.45 
$45,371.88 
$4,765.00 
$918.63 
$14.40 
$976.50 
$1,107.82 
$248.75 
$1,288.71 
$269.33 
1 $80.80 
$1,107.80 
1 $104.12 
$3,522.28 
$1.73 
$3,015.09 
$1,107.82 
$192.00 
$1,288.71 
$11,704.32 
$1,107.80 
$1,107.82 
$1,288.71 
$1,288.71 
$1,107.81 
$44,207.05 
$7,058.35 
$6,139.72 
$6,125.32 
$5,148.82 
$4,041.00 
$3,792.25 , 
$2,503.54 
$2,234.21 
$2,153.41 
$8,569.08 
$7,461.28 
$7,357.16 
$3,834.88 
$3,833.15 
$818.06 
-$289.76 
$1,735.24 
$1,543.24 
$254.53 
$11,958.85 
$254.53 
$458.23 
$7,065.68 
$5,957.88 
$4,850.06 
$3,561.35 
$2,272.64 
$1,164.83J 
On the date that the Writ was received by the Bank, there was $17,910.94 in 
the account. That sum was taken from the account to suspense. On November 17 ; it 
was taken from suspense account and applied to Bank Loan #51-027480. The Bank 
responded to the Writ on November 6th, 2007. Subsequent to that date, as 
demonstrated by the table, deposits to the account totaled $45,371.88. The Bank 
allowed checks to be drawn against new deposits to the account; these checks through 
January 4th, 2007, totaled $44,207.05. The trial court's criticism of the Bank focuses 
1 o 
not on the setoff which the trial court suggests was allowed but upon the Bank's 
payment of these subsequent checks. The trial court believed that by reason of service 
of the Writ of Garnishment the Bank was required to regard Bud Bailey Construction 
as having a continuing "superior security interest" and, hence, pay over any 
subsequent deposits the Bank didn't setoff for itself to Bud Bailey Construction. The 
trial court's legal conclusion is as follows: 
In fact, they [Bank] moved all these other people so that checks could 
go out and pay them ahead of their own, ahead of the garnishment that 
came in that I believe under the law had a superior security interest. 
Hearing Transcript, page 9, lines 5-8 (emphasis added), Second Addendum to Brief. 
The trial court is entirely in error on this point as a matter of law. The service 
of a Writ of Garnishment does not create any continuing "superior security interest." 
There is a type of garnishment which can constitute a "continuing garnishment" but 
that is limited to those situations where there are periodic payments particularly in 
those cases involving collection of delinquent child support. Rule 64D(1) provides as 
follows: 
The trial court opined that this was $42,000. Hearing Transcript at page 8, line 18, 
Second Addendum to Brief. 
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 Hearing Transcript at pages 8-9, Second Addendum to Brief. 
(1) Writ of continuing garnishment. 
(1)(1) After final judgment, the plaintiff may obtain a writ of 
continuing garnishment against any non exempt periodic payment. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). Pursuant to this Rule continuing 
garnishments are limited to "non exempt periodic payments." The Rule sets forth 
specific rules that govern how they are to be managed. Rule 64D(1). Typically these 
are used for employers who pay periodic wages to employees. Id. When any entity 
seeks such a "continuing garnishment" the application must so state. The prescribed 
standard form, Application for Garnishment, requires the applicant to mark on its 
application if it seeks to have an Order for such a "continuing garnishment." In this 
case, Bud Bailey wouldn't be entitled to a "continuing garnishment" because it was 
seeking to garnish non-periodic payments, the irregular deposits of Construction 
Associates into its bank deposit account. Furthermore, Bud Bailey Construction did 
not seek nor did it receive an Order entitling it to such a "continuing garnishment." 
An examination of Bud Bailey Construction's Application for Garnishment in this 
matter shows that there was no request for a "continuing garnishment." 
2. I request that a 
X Writ of Garnishment 
Writ of Continuing Garnishment 
Writ of Continuing Garnishment for child support 
be issued and served upon . . . 
Bud Bailey Construction, Application for Garnishment. (R. 99). 
There was no legal basis for, nor was there any request for, a "continuing 
garnishment" in this matter. Furthermore, Bud Bailey Construction did not seek such 
a remedy; it only sought the $17,910.94 in the deposit account on the date of the Writ 
of Garnishment was served on the Bank. See Motion for Order to Show Cause. (R. 
114) See Bud Bailey Construction's Reply Memorandum which also sought only the 
sum of $17,910.94. (R. 194) The trial court, acting on its own volition, imposed upon 
the Bank liability to Bud Bailey for the remaining amount of the unsatisfied judgment 
of Bud Bailey Construction. The trial court imposed this liability on the Bank because 
the Bank allowed Construction Associates to draw checks against subsequent deposits 
to its deposit account. 
The trial court's ruling that service of a Writ of Garnishment imposes upon the 
garnishee a duty to regard the garnishing party as having a continuing lien with a 
"superior security interest" is wrong. Utah courts have long held that garnishment 
reaches only the property held by the garnishee at the time of service of the Writ of 
Garnishment. 
By the great weight of authority the liability of the garnishee is limited 
to the property of the defendant in the possession or under the control of 
the garnishee, and the indebtedness of the garnishee to the defendant at 
the time the writ of garnishment is served. The writ does not render the 
garnishee liable for property coming into his possession, or 
indebtedness incurred after the writ has been served. 
Acheson-Harder Co, v. Western Wholesale Notions Co., 72 Utah 323, 325; 269 P. 
1032, 1034; 60 A.L.R. 881 (Utah 1928). 
The court must ascertain the rights and liabilities of the respective 
parties as of the time of the levy of the writ of garnishment... In view 
of the documentary evidence, the court should have found that the bank 
was indebted to defendant Shire as of the date of the levy of the writ of 
garnishment. 
Seaboard Finance Co. v. Shire, 117 Utah 546, 218 P.2d 282,287 (1950). 
The treatise, American Jurisprudence 2d, notes that these Utah cases are taking 
the majority position: 
An attachment lien covers only the actual interest or indebtedness 
existing at the time of the attachment, and will not reach debts or 
property subsequently acquired. Similarly, a writ of garnishment 
covers only the property or money of a debtor in the hands of the 
garnishee or the indebtedness which the garnishee has a present 
obligation to pay to the judgment debtor at the time of the service of the 
writ, and nothing beyond that. 
6 Am Jur.2d Attachment and Garnishment §488 (2007). (emphasis added). The 
minority position is that the time period is extended from the date of service of the 
Writ until the garnishee's answer is made. Id. Irrespective of which time period Utah 
law requires, the facts in this matter are that the balance in the account between 
November 1st and November 6th when the Bank replied, did not change, there were no 
deposits in that time period to the balance of $17,910.94. See Spreadsheet, pages 32-
33. 
Following this principle, the Rule 64D provides that the garnishee is "released 
from liability" upon filing of the garnishee's answer. Rule 64D(j)(l). That Rule caps 
the liability of the garnishee to that time period and imposes no duties as to 
subsequent funds or property coming into its possession. There is absolutely nothing 
in the Utah Rules of Procedure or Utah case law which suggests that subsequent 
deposits or property coming into possession of a garnishee are subject to a continuing 
lien or garnishment. Indeed, the rules contemplates that a new garnishment order can 
be issued repeatedly. Rule 64D(f). The trial court is wrong in suggesting that the Bank 
has some remaining duty after responding to the Writ as to subsequent funds 
deposited by Construction Associates. What is more that issue was beyond any 
request of Bud Bailey Construction and not properly before the trial court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES TO 
BUD BAILEY CONSTRUCTION. 
The only basis suggested in Rule 64D for awarding attorneys fees against a 
garnishee is on the basis that the garnishee failed to comply with the garnishment 
rules. See Rule 64D(j)(2). The amount ordered is to be based upon the attorneys fees 
incurred by parties as a result of the garnishee's failure. Id. In this matter, the trial 
court entered its Order that the Bank pay "Bud Bailey's attorney fees associated with 
briefing, preparing and arguing evidence in connection with the third hearing . . . " (R. 
251, section 15, First Addendum to Brief) Apparently the basis for this award is that 
the trial court found the Bank in contempt for not treating the Writ of Garnishment as 
being a "continuing lien" and/or that the Bank did not have the right to setoff the 
funds. Apparently, and more precisely the failure of the Bank to remit the entire sum 
of $38,769.71, the balance of the Bud Bailey Construction judgment was the basis for 
this contempt. This ruling is interesting inasmuch as Bud Bailey never suggested that 
this relief was what it sought. The Bank is held in contempt because it didn't pay a 
sum wholly determined by the court. 
The Court of Appeal's decision on the principal issues in this appeal should 
lead directly to a reversal or affirmation of the attorney's fee award. The Bank 
believes the award of attorney's fees is wholly unjustified. It is certainly not in 
contempt of any court nor its lawful orders. 
TV. THE SERVICE OF THE WRIT OF GARNISHMENT UPON CACHE 
VALLEY BANK DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 4 
This issue is of minor consequence to the present determination of the issues in 
this matter. However, the failure of the Bank to properly answer the Writ of 
Garnishment initially by claiming its right to setoff should be excused because Bud 
Bailey Construction failed to effect proper service. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that corporations be served as 
follows: 
(d) Method of Sendee. Unless waived in writing, service of the 
summons and complaint shall be by one of the following methods: 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, 
upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated association which is 
subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute 
to receive sendee and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy of 
the summons and the complaint to the defendant. If no such officer or 
agent can be found within the state, and the defendant has, or advertises 
or holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the 
state or elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then 
upon the person in charge of such office or place of business; 
Rule 4 (emphasis added). The Bank raised this defense in its initial and 
subsequent pleadings. (R. 136, numbered paragraphs 1-3; R. 163-64, numbered 
paragraphs #10 and #12; and R. 164-65, Argument, Section I) Bud Bailey 
Construction responded in its Reply Memorandum by arguing that the process server 
return has printed on it that the person served "represented herself as an authorized 
employee of Cache Bank, designated to receive service of such process pursuant to 
Rule 4(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure with a Writ of Garnishment" as 
evidenced by the Constable's Proof of Service attached hereto as Exhibit "B". (R. 
187-188, numbered paragraphs 10 & 12, Exhibit "B" is at R. 199, 201) Actually the 
returns of service are worded a little differently than represented by Bud Bailey 
Construction, they state not that the employee so identified herself but that the 
Constable so certifies that the individual is so designated. Id. Courts cannot allow 
such efforts by any person to "self certify" or alternatively allow constables to 
"certify" individuals to be officers, managing agents or designated agents for service 
of process. This is a bootstrap argument; one that attempts to create its own 
justification. 
Rule 4 requires that service on corporations be upon "an officer, a managing or 
general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service 
of process." The secretary/assistants named by the Constable in these returns are not 
officers, managing agents, general agents or other agents authorized by appointment 
or by law. They are not such and have never represented themselves as such. 
Cache Valley Bank does not intend to make much of this issue. It recognizes 
that once it entered an appearance through its legal counsel that it was a party to this 
garnishment action and thereby waived, for purposes of the future proceedings any 
previous defects in the service of process. But if there is any failure to fully and 
completely answer the Writ of Garnishment interrogatories and initially claim setoff, 
those failures must be excused by reason of the failure of Bud Bailey Construction to 
properly serve process on Cache Valley Bank. Clearly, once the Bank was advised of 
the situation correctly, it asserted all of its rights. 
This counsel is the registered agent for Cache Valley Bank Pursuant to Rule 47 
Bud Bailey could also have served any officers or managing agents of the Bank. The 
service of the Writ and the Order to Show Cause was not in accordance with Rule 4 
and any failure to answer the interrogatories, initially, should be excused. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court apparently accepted the right of Cache Valley Bank to setoff the 
funds in the deposit account on November 1,2007. To whatever extent the trial 
court's Order does not recognize that right, the Court of Appeals should make a legal 
determination. That determination should be that, pursuant to the revised Article 9, 
under these facts, Cache Valley Bank had a clear right to setoff all such funds. Cache 
Valley Bank had "control95 of the Construction Associates deposit accounts. The 
deposit accounts were attached and perfected to its security interest. In addition, any 
funds in those accounts were proceeds from collateral (accounts receivable) that were 
also security for the Bank's loans. The court should also find that there is no basis on 
which the Bud Bailey Construction Writ of Garnishment may be considered a 
"continuing garnishment." A "continuing garnishment" was not sought and the Bud 
Bailey Construction garnishment is clearly not a "continuing garnishment." Once the 
Bank replied to that Writ, it was relieved of any further liability whatsoever. On these 
two principal issues the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
The determination to award attorney's fees award should also be reversed as it 
is based upon the trial court's errors on the first two issues. In addition the court 
should find there was a failure to follow Rule 4's requirements for service of process. 
The Bank's request with respect to that issue is that it not be bound by the incomplete 
answers provided. Once the Bank was properly informed of the issues, it responded 
appropriately, asserting all its rights to setoff the funds and to claim its rightful legal 
position as having a perfected security interest in the deposit accounts. 
DATED November 24th, 2007. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT - FARNIINGTON 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COLONIAL BUILDING SUPPLY, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES, INC. 
separately and dba as KRT DRYWALL, BUD 
BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., LAYTON 
POINTE, L.C., and JOHN DOES 1 through 
10, 
Defendants. 
BUD BAILEY CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
ORDER 
Cross-Claim and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
Case No. 050700267 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
vs. 
CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES, INC. 
separately and dba as KRT DRYWALL, 
Cross-Claim Defendant; and WILLIAM KIM 
PITCHER, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
CACHE VALLEY BANK, Garnishee. 
On April 2, 2007, the Court held a third hearing for the parties to present evidence and 
oral arguments regarding Bud Bailey Construction, Inc.'s Motion for Order to Show Cause In Re 
Contempt. Cody W. Wilson was in attendance representing Bud Bailey Construction, Inc. (Bud 
Bailey") and Todd K. Jensen was in attendance representing Garnishee Cache Valley Bank. 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file, having heard three oral arguments from the 
parties, reviewed all the evidence submitted and for good cause appearing, now finds as 
follows: 
ORDER 
The Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is in Contempt of the Order to Show Cause. 
2. On October 19, 2006, the Court issued a Writ of Garnishment ordering Cache Valley 
Bank to garnish the account(s) of the Third-Party Defendant Construction Associates, Inc. dba 
KRT Drywall ("Third-Party Defendant"). 
3. On November 1, 2006, the Writ of Garnishment was served on Garnishee Cache Valley 
Bank. 
4. On November 6, 2006, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank served a copy of the Writ of 
Garnishment, Answers to Interrogatories, Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions form, and two 
copies of the Reply and Request for Hearing form on the Third-Party Defendant. 
5. On November 8, 2006, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank filed answers to interrogatories 
indicating it was in possession or control of property in which Bud Bailey and Third-Party 
Defendant had an interest. 
6. Garnishee Cache Valley Bank failed to provide an offset in its answer to interrogatories 
or at any other relevant time as required by law. 
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7 On January 25, 2007, at the time the Court issued the Notice and Order to Show Cause, 
Garnishee Cache Valley Bank was not in compliance with the garnishment statute as required 
by Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that it failed to provide any notice of an offset 
or right to offset within the required time period 
8. On or about November 17, 2006, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank took or attempted to 
take an offset in the amount of $17,901 94 in the respective account(s) of the Third-Party 
Defendant Afterwards Garnishee Cache Valley Bank did not take any further offsets in the 
account(s) However, after the garnishment was issued and served an additional total of 
$41,789 52 was in the account on deposit by the Third-Party Defendant. 
9. Garnishee Cache Valley Bank then determined that instead of complying with the 
garnishment and order of the Court it wanted the money from the account to go to other third-
parties to pay other debts of the Third-Party Defendant and did therefore purposefully move 
third-parties debts in front of a valid judgment and in front of a valid garnishment filed by Bud 
Bailey 
10 Garnishee Cache Valley Bank allowed Third-Party Defendant to continue to write checks 
from said account(s) and did allow those checks to clear Cache Valley Bank to pay third-parties 
while the valid garnishment of Bud Bailey was in place 
11 The funds that Garnishee Cache Valley Bank allowed to go out of the account(s) were in 
excess of the garnishment of Bud Bailey 
12 Garnishee Cache Valley Bank took or attempted to take what they deemed their own 
money and thereafter there were still sufficient funds in the account to pay the valid garnishment 
ahead of any third-parties Despite these sufficient funds, Garnishee Cache Valley Bank 
allowed third-party debts to be paid circumventing a valid judgment and valid garnishment 
Garnishee Cache Valley Bank denoted this action as a "de facto receivership " 
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13. There is nothing in Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Uniform Commercial 
Code, case law or any agreement submitted to the Court that would allow Garnishee Cache 
Valley Bank to create this "de facto receivership" allowing Garnishee Cache Valley Bank to do 
what it has done in this case - circumventing a valid judgment and valid garnishment. 
14. The actions of Garnishee Cache Valley Bank violated the Order of this Court and as a 
result Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is in Contempt of the Order to Show Cause dated January 
25, 2007. 
15. Garnishee Cache Valley Bank is ordered to pay the sum remaining on the Garnishment 
in the amount of $38,769.71 plus Bud Bailey's attorney fees associated with briefing, preparing 
and arguing evidence in connection with the third hearing regarding Bud Bailey's Motion for 
Order to Show Cause In Re Contempt in the amount of $2,279.40. See Affidavit of Attorney 
Fees attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
16. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Bud Bailey and against Garnishee Cache Valley 
Bank in the amount of $41,049.11. 
DATED this day of April, 2007. 
SECOND JUDICIAL COURT 
HONORABLE JUDGE JON M. MEMMOTT 
OfKCH 1-n OrriPr 4 
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Attorney for Garnishee Cache Valley Bank 
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Plaintiff, Appellate Case No. 20070533-SC 
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CONSTRUCTION ASSOCIATES, INC., 
et al., 
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CACHE VALLEY BANK, Granishee. 
MOTION HEARING APRIL 2, 2007 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
COPY 
APPEARANCES 
For the Defendants: BRADLEY G. NYKAMP 
Attorney at Law 
For the Garnishee: TODD K. JENSON 
Attorney at Law 
* * * 
1 FARMINGTON, UTAH - APRIL 2, 2007 
2 JUDGE JON M. MEMMOTT 
3 ^PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT - VIDEOTAPE NOT COMPLETE* 
4 P R O C E E D I N G S 
5 THE COURT: We're here to accept argument on the 
6 Order to Show Cause and Contempt for the Garnishment. I have 
7 received pleadings, I've reviewed and read them. There was 
8 some supplemental documents received. Both parties want to 
9 present oral argument today? What do you want to do? 
10 MR. NYKAMP: I don't (inaudible), Your Honor, that 
11 I necessarily need to present or oral argument but would be 
12 happen to answer any questions — 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. NYKAMP: - that Your Honor has. I think it was 
15 pretty well explained in my brief. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. JENSON: Your Honor, I'm Todd Jenson 
18 representing Cache Valley Bank (inaudible) present oral 
19 argument (inaudible) review the bank's position and go 
20 (inaudible). 
21 THE COURT: Maybe I can, Mr. Jenson, have some very 
22 specific questions. I understand the positions you're saying 
23 and everything else. Let me tell you the greatest difficulty 
24 I have with the position of the bank is asserting is that 
25 they paid the first writ obviously which is I think — 
MR. JENSON: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: But the second one on November 1 they 
said they entered into something called a defacto 
receivership. Now nowhere under the law of garnishment or 
nowhere in the documents of any document that I have read 
from the bank that I have gone through, do I have this 
defacto receivership and I understand receivership in 
bankruptcy, I understand receiverships but I don't know what 
this defacto receivership is and let me tell you the biggest 
issue I have with the bank. There are, since the date of the 
garnishment, 27 checks were allowed to be cleared through the 
bank account. One credit card payment was allowed to clear 
through the bank and then one auto transfer debit, I assume 
that was a debit card or something like that for $11/000. So 
there was a debit card allowed to clear through the bank. To 
me that would indicate that - and in that amount is 
$42,412.48 from after they received the garnishment, they 
allowed to be cleared and paid to other parties. I mean, 
when the bank checks clear it's not the bank receiving the 
money on their loans or anything else, it's allowing another 
party to receive a debt they have against this party and it 
appears to me that the bank with this defacto receivership is 
deciding as against a court order that these people have the 
right to receive the funds ahead of themselves, the bank, 
because they're not taking the funds for themselves, I 
1 understood if they said, okay, we want an offset, we're 
2 closing down this account, we're taking the money to offset, 
3 we think there's a danger they're not going to pay and they 
4 exercise that. I don't have any problem with doing that as I 
5 read the documents but I don't understand how they can allow 
6 themselves in this defacto receivership to go against a court 
7 order and say these other people have a right to get the 
8 money instead of us, the bank, and instead of the garnishee, 
9 I mean the person that garnished. That's what I don't 
10 understand under the law because I can't find that or read 
11 that or allow that in anywhere under the law. So that's an 
12 issue I need to understand. 
13 MR. JENSON: I can go through that. What happened 
14 - and in fact, oh, about a year ago is when the bank's served 
15 the first garnishment and the bank (inaudible) dropped the 
16 ball on that one (inaudible) garnishment and didn't exercise 
17 the right (inaudible) at that time. 
18 Then in October I believe it was, don't know the 
19 exact date, (inaudible) served the second garnishment. At 
20 that time the bank exercised that remedy and they did set it 
21 off, they drew it out the account and applied all the funds 
22 they could which was about $17,000 towards the loan and 
23 that's shown in our supplemental exhibit. Let's see which 
24 one it is. That is shown in Exhibit E of the supplemental 
25 exhibit. You can see there the loan amount is again at the 
1 top is $46,300 and then down at the bottom you can see a 
2 principle only payment on 11-17 for that amount, $17,000. 
3 The bank did allow the debtors to do business but they 
4 monitored - it was some time after the first punch list that 
5 they began to monitor payments coming in and only allow 
6 certain ones to go out. 
7 THE COURT: How could you allow certain to go out 
8 if they have a garnishment that the court says comes before 
9 the amount they allow to go out? I mean, how do they allow 
10 it to go out legally? 
11 MR. JENSON: The first garnishment would have 
12 expired after 120 days. That's under the rule. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. JENSON: So after that time the bank, the bank 
15 was (inaudible) total of three loans, couple hundred thousand 
16 dollars together. They didn't want to kill the business, 
17 they wanted it to keep going. 
18 THE COURT: Okay, okay -
19 MR. JENSON: So they -
20 THE COURT: I understand what they did. Legally 
21 how can they do that? That's my question because I read the 
22 cases, I read everything and there's nothing in the law that 
23 I can find that allows them to do that once they receive the 
24 garnishment. I agree with you that if they have a remedy for 
25 offset, they have monies that they want to claim for 
themselves and for their own debts, they can do that and 
don't have any quarrel with that because I think the law 
allows that, garnishment and all secured interest. 
My question is, how can they be the arbitrator 
I 
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decide yes, we want - because when you write a check or a 
write a debit card, I mean, you're indebted to somebody but 
the people that are indebted to on those accounts don't have 
preference in charge of either the bank or Colonial. They're 
not in position in front of them for these funds and yet the 
bank by what it's doing is putting them in that position. 
That's what I don't understand because they're moving 
somebody up by what they do, ahead of the - and you're on 
notice not to do that. I mean, it's not like the bank 
doesn't know because this is the second one. I just wonder 
under the law how they can do that? 
MR. JENSON: Okay. With the second garnishment I 
understand that when the bank responded to the second 
garnishment, in it's answers, I think it's line 3 in the 
garnishment it says, the bank is suppose to declare its 
reason for setting off any funds and the bank omitted that 
and (inaudible) order to show cause issued. The bank then 
showed that it did have a valid security interest in the 
(inaudible) and whatnot then all the funds then would be 
under control of the bank; is that not correct? 
THE COURT: If the bank takes them for themselves. 
1 MR. JENSON: Isn't that what the bank did though? 
2 THE COURT: No, it didn't. It allowed them -
3 that's exactly what I'm saying. They allowed all these 
4 checks to be paid to other parties. They allowed to a 
5 VISA/Mastercharge to pay off debts of other parties. They 
6 allowed this debit card to go to pay off other parties. I 
7 understand the bank's argument and I understand the security 
8 agreement but I've dealt with this and that means the bank 
9 has the right to take it off their debts, to offset their 
10 loans, to offset their payments but they didn't do that. 
11 That's the difficulty that I have. That's not what they did. 
12 They allowed it to be paid to other parties other than 
13 themselves and other than Colonial because they decided that 
14 could do this in this defacto receivership and that's what 
15 I'm saying, that's where I really have problems with the law 
16 because there's nothing in the law that I'm aware of that 
17 allows them to do that. 
18 MR. JENSON: If the bank, however, is controlling 
19 what is paid out and why only so that the business can 
20 continue to pay, that goes to the bank. 
21 THE COURT: What legal authority does it have to do 
22 that? 
23 MR. JENSON: Well, it's allowed to do that under 
24 its security agreement. 
25 THE COURT: No, there is no place in the security 
agreement that it says it can have a defacto receivership. 
What it does is it says it can seize the account and it lists 
the items that it can seize and take control of those items 
and have them pay their debts but it can't substitute itself 
for the court or substitute itself for somebody else and say, 
"You know what, I'm going to pay your claim but I'm not going 
to allow your claim. I'm going to move your claim ahead of 
this claim because I think that's in my interest to move your 
claim ahead of my claim." I mean, they're taking on a role 
here that I think is really unique under the law and I don't 
think it's allowed, that's what I'm trying to ask. I mean, I 
understand the agreement and I understand the ability to 
offset and I understand the ability for them to say, "You now 
what, we don't think this is going to do that and we want to 
take all your receivables out to pay our debt because we 
don't you're going to be able to pay." I don't have any 
problem with that because that's what they agreed to and 
that's what the parties agreed to but that's not what they 
did, that's the part that I have the problem with because 
that's not what they did. 
MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that. From my point 
of view if the bank is controlling the funds it's controlling 
how they're spent in furtherance of its own interests. If 
the bank is entitled to all of those funds and if they 
release funds so they can be paid more in the future, that to 
me seems to go right in the line of the bank's authority to 
keep all the funds and control it for themself and pay off 
debts. 
THE COURT: Then we go back to the question, how 
under the law, what section of the law, what section of the 
code, what part of the contract, what law in Utah, what 
allows them to do this, what banking regulation allows them 
to assume that role? What under the UCC, what position 
allows them to determine under the UCC that people that have 
security interests ahead of all these other people, that 
these other people get to be paid first? 
MR. JENSON: So that I'm clear then, what the Court 
would - speaking hypothetically - what the Court would have 
liked to have seen is on service of the second garnishment 
when the bank set off (inaudible) $17,000 and applied it to 
the loan, from then on all other funds that were received 
through the bank would go to — 
THE COURT: Yes, I mean, $42,000 came in. If they 
took $17,000 for their loan, that's fine but there was still 
enough money to pay the garnishment. 
MR. JENSON: If the bank had kept that remaining 
amount to itself (inaudible) paid out again. 
THE COURT: Then if their security interest was 
superior, yes, they would have been allowed to do that. I 
don't have a problem but money came in, they were on notice 
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1 of garnishment, they set off their amount, they protected 
2 themselves, they took their $17,000 but there was $41,000 
3 that came in. There was enough money to pay - protect the 
4 bank and protect the other but unilaterally they decided not 
5 to do it. In fact, they moved all these other people so the 
6 checks could go out and pay them ahead of their own, ahead of 
7 the garnishment that came in that I believe under the law had 
8 a superior security interest. 
9 MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that. The only 
10 difference I see here is that if the bank had those funds in 
11 its control and chose to release them so they could be paid 
12 more — 
13 THE COURT: No, they didn't have the choice once 
14 they received the garnishment. They either had to take them 
15 themselves or give them to somebody that had a higher 
16 security interest. If they didn't want to protect their own 
17 rights - and the people that allowed this to do it, that 
18 controlled this was the bank and now what are they going to 
19 do? Are they going to go to all these individuals and get 
20 that money back from them? No. I mean I know Cache Valley -
21 they're not going to go to all these people that checks were 
22 written and to VISA and everything else and say we want this 
23 money back. 
24 MR. JENSON: Okay, I can see that too if the 
25 position that all the funds that were received by the bank 
1 after the date of garnishment, unless the bank put those 
2 funds on a direct -
3 (Original videotape ends at 4:13:49, 
4 I Docket shows ending at 4:37) 
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